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THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION &
ENFORCEMENT ACT (UCCJEA)-A METAMORPHOSIS OF THE
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (UCCTA)
KEU.Y GAMES STON "
We are a mobile society. Each day, many parents and their children
leave one state and move to another. This is especially true in North
Dakota, due to the presence of two military bases in our state. As
people's lives cross state lines, so too do their domestic relations. As a
result, multistate custody disputes are on the rise across the nation.
Multistate custody disputes occur when more than one state claims a
genuine interest in resolving a custody dispute in its own way. Such child
custody struggles often lead to heart-wrenching results both for the
children and the contestants involved. 1 To deal with these increasingly
common and potentially painful cases, courts must often engage in
elaborate jurisdictional struggles.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)2 was created
to end the interstate custody jurisdictional tug-of-war between states.
However, the UCCJA has not been uniformly administered. States have
enacted various versions of the Act and have not applied it consistently.
Further, the Act is ambiguous regarding a number of issues, such as:
whether the forum state must have personal jurisdiction over both.
parents; what constitutes adequate notice to contestants; when a court has
jurisdiction to hear a custody dispute; when a court may modify another
state's custody order; and what types of "custody" proceedings it
governs. In addition, it is unclear whether the Act applies to recognition
of Indian tribal court custody orders.
As a result of these ambiguities, the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) was drafted. North Dakota
enacted the UCCJEA on March 30, 1999.3 The UCCJEA is intended to
* Clinical Instructor, Native American Law Project, UND Legal Aid Clinic; J.D., University of
Oklahoma, 1988. The author would like to thank the people of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe for
allowing her to represent and work on behalf of the children of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe.
1. O'Connell v. KIrchner, 513 U.S. 1138, 1138 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of
stay). See also In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239,246 (Iowa 1992).
2. UNI. CQM CUSTODY JUnuSDICnoN Acr, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988) [hereinafler UCCIA].
3. Recently, the North Dakota Legislature adopted the UCCJEA. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§
14-14.1-01 to -37 (1999), available at North Dakota Legislative Home Page (visited June 4, 1999)
<httpJllwww.state.nd.us/lr/>. This statute will become effective August 1, 1999. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 1-02-42 (Supp. 1997). Senate Bill 2152, the bill for an act to create chapter 14-14.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code. was introduced in the Senate on January 5. 1999; passed by the Senate on
January 14, 1999; amended and passed by the House on March 8. 1999; passed as amended by the
Senate on March 22. 1999; signed by the governor on March 30. 1999; and filed with the secretary of
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clarify 'the ambiguities of the UCCJA and enhance states' ability to
enforce custody orders quickly and efficiently.
This article discusses the UCCIEA and its likely effect on child
custody determinations. It begins with a review of both the UCCJA and
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act4 (PKPA), the federal law which
requires states to give full faith and credit to other states' custody orders.
The article will further discuss how the UCCJEA seeks to harmonize and
resolve the ambiguities between the two acts, focusing on a number of
specific issues and changes.
I. BRIEF HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ACTS
Three main statutory enactments have controlled the development
of the law in this area, the UCCJA, the PKPA, and the UCCJEA.
Understanding the most recent enactment, the UCCJEA, requires an
understanding of the two acts which came before it, and which it attempts
to harmonize.
A. THE UNmORM CHlLD CUSTODY JURISDIcTION ACT (UCCJA)
Originally, a group of scholars developed the UCCJA as a model
act. It initially received praise as the solution to the jurisdictional issues
surrounding custody of the interstate child. Both the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association approved the UCCJA in 1968.5 All fifty states, the District
of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have subsequently adopted it.6
The UCCJA primarily focused on preventing parental child snatch-
ing for the purpose of forum shopping following a divorce action. Prior
to the adoption of the UCCIA, jurisdictional rules encouraged a parent
who lost a custody case in one state to grab the child and move to
another state and re-litigate the custody issue.7 - The unsuccessful litigant
. in the first custody battle would likely prevail in the second, due the new
forum's desire to keep the child within its jurisdictional boundaries.
The UCCJA was also designed to end repeated custody litigation,
which is extremely harmful to children.8 Toward that end, it established
state on March 30. 1999. See North Dakota Legislative Home Page (visited June 4, 1999) httpl/www.
state.nd.us/Ir/text/bill_action/ba2152.htnl>. Throughout this article, North Dakota's UCCJEA will be
designated as adopted in 1999.
4. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 StaL 3568 (1980)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994)).
5. UCCA prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 116-17 (1988).
6. Robert G. Spector. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (with Prefatory
Note and Comments by Robert G. Spector), 32 FAM,. L. Q. 301,305 (1998). North Dakota also enacted
the UCCIA, N.D. Ceir. Coow §§ 14-14-01 to -26. but the legislature repealed it when it enacted the
UCCJEA, N.D. CE r. CoDs ch. 14-14.1.
7. UCCJA § 1, 9 U.L.A. 123-24 (1988) (providing the purpose of the act).
8. Henry H. Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCIA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 297,
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jurisdictional rules that required the custody litigation to be heard in the
state most closely connected to the child. The Act set out the bases upon
which a court, competent to make custody determinations, could estab-
lish jurisdiction over the custody of a child.9 Despite the UCCJA,
however, courts were not required to give full faith and credit to custody
decrees from other states. Therefore, Congress in 1980 enacted the
PKPA, which requires states to accord full faith and credit to custody
decrees rendered by sister states.lO
B. THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION Act (PKPA)
The PKPA is a federal act that mandates which custody orders shall
be given full faith and credit in sister states. If a custody order
substantially complies with the PKPA, it is entitled to full faith and credit
in other states.11 The import of the full faith and credit requirement is
clear to any party who moves from one state to another and needs to
have a custody order recognized.
300 n.15 (1981).
9. UCCJA § 3.9 U.L.A. 143-44 (1988).
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters
has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or
modification decree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement
of the proceeding, or (i) had been the child's home state within 6 months
before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this
State because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody
or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to
live in this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least
one contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is
available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse
or is otherwise neglected [or dependent]; or
4)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2). or (3), or
another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child,
and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume
jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical
presence in this State of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants,
is not alone sufficient to conferjurisdiction on a court of this State to make
a child custody determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for
jurisdiction to determine his custody.
Id
10. Greg Waller, When the Rules Don't Fit the Fame: Application of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act And the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to Interstate Adoption Proceedings. 33
HARv. 3. o LEois. 271,274 (1996).
11. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
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The import of the full faith and credit mandate is also visible in the
custody provisions of domestic violence protection orders. While the
Violence Against Women Act requires courts to give full faith and credit
to protection orders, it specifically exempts custody provisions from this
requirement.' 2 Thus, it is imperative that all custody and visitation
orders, whether pursuant to an establishment of paternity, secondary to a
divorce, or through. a domestic violence protection order, adhere to the
provisions of the PKPA to ensure the order's custody and visitation
provisions will be entitled to full faith and credit in other states.
The language of the PKPA establishing the bases for jurisdiction
generally tracks the language of the jurisdictional bases of the UCCJA,
though there are minor exceptions. 13 Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA clear-
ly gives preference to home state jurisdiction.' 4 The PKPA only allows a
state to exercise jurisdiction if no other state qualifies as a home state;
other jurisdictional grounds may only be asserted if there is no home
state. 15 The PKPA's home state preference extends to modifications of
existing custody orders, in that it authorizes continuing exclusive juris-
diction in the original state so long as one parent or the child remains
there and that state has continuing jurisdiction under its own laws. 16 The
12. Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2265-66 (1994).
13. Section 8 of the PKPA establishes the jurisdictional conditions of the PKPA. This section
provides, in relevant part:
A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions
of this section only if.
1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the commencement of
the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within six months before the
date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State
because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a
contestant continues to live in such State;
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A),
and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such State assume
jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with such State other than mere physical
presence in such State, and (U) there is available in such State substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c). In addition, the PKPA addresses emergency jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §
1738A(c)(2)(C).
14. "Home State! is defined by the PKPA as:
LTlhe State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his
parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months, and
in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child lived from birth
with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are
counted as part of the six month or other period.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4).
15. Id.
16. Spector, supra note 6, at 306.
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UCCJA, in contrast, sets forth no preference for utilizing the
jurisdictional provisions. This creates a jurisdictional loophole, one
which has allowed courts to be creative in utilizing the four jurisdictional
provisions of the UCCJA.
C. THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT
(UCCIEA)
The UCCJEA is the most recent act; the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform States Laws unanimously adopted it in July
1997.17 The American Bar Association approved the Act in February
1998, and it is now available for state adoption.18 The most important
changes the UCCJEA makes to the UCCJA is giving jurisdictional
priority and exclusive continuing jurisdiction to the home state. These
changes harmonize the UCCJEA with the PKPA.19 This greatly increases
the chances that custody and visitation orders will comply with the
PKPA, and, thus, that they will be granted full faith and credit.
The UCCJEA also seeks to clarify ambiguities in the UCCJA, which
have resulted in states interpreting and applying the UCCJA inconsistent-
ly. Finally, the UCCJEA conforms with the Violence Against Women
Act20 to promote the goal of protecting victims of domestic violence who
flee with their children to safety.21
I. JURISDICTIONAL CONCERNS
As with all jurisdictional laws, these acts' provisions must satisfy the
Constitution's due process clause. Due process protects against
fundamental unfairness by requiring a court to have both subject matter
and in personam jurisdiction over parties before it can bind them. 22 It
further requires that parties receive the procedural protections of notice
and an opportunity to be heard.23 and protects against fundamental
unfairness by requiring a court to have in personam jurisdiction over
parties. Therefore, the issues of jurisdiction and notice requirements are
important to the UCCJEA.
17. Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC's of the UCCJEA: Interstate Child Custody Practice Under the
NewAct, 32 FAm. L. Q. 267,267 (1998).
18. Id. at 267-68. North Dakota adopted the UCCJEA this year. See N.D. CENr. CODE 14-14.1-
01 to -37 (1999). The UCCJEA has also been adopted by Alaska and Oklahoma. Id. at 268 n.5.
19. Hoff, supra note 17, at 279-81.
20. Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2265-66 (1994).
21. Hoff, supra note 17, at 268.
22. See Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction 1995 U. I LL. L. REV.
813, 819-23 nn.23.41.
23. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965). See also Brigitte Bodenheimer & Janet
Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. DAVIs
L. Rv. 229,248 (1979).
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A. SUBJECT MAT'ER AND IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
First, the UCCJA and UCCJEA confer subject matter jurisdiction
over the parties to a child custody dispute.24 Judgments rendered in the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction are void, and parties cannot confer
subject matter jurisdiction to the court by waiver or consent. Thus, it is
crucial that one comply with the UCCJEA's subject matter provisions.25
In addition,, the Constitution imposes a limit on the exercise of juris-
diction in the form of the due process clause. 26 Generally, due process
requires a court to have in personaxn jurisdiction over parties before its
judgment can bind them. In most cases, this requires a party to have
minimum contacts with the forum. 27
However, the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner28 acknowledged some
exceptions to the minimum contacts analysis set forth in International
Shoe v. Washington.29 These exceptions included some "status" deter-
minations.30 "Status has been defined as a relationship between two per-
sons, which is not temporary in its nature, is not terminable at the mere
will of either and with which the state is concerned." 31 This definition
includes proceedings which affect the relationship between parent and
child: "Marriage is a status ... and so too is the relationship of parent
and child .... "32 The status definition also encompasses the right and
obligation of the state in its parens patriae role to consider the welfare of
a child.33 Generally, status determinations such as these do not have to
comport with minimum contact standards, and thus do not require in
personam jurisdiction over the parties.
Courts generally classify custody disputes as status proceedings in
which these special jurisdictional rules apply. The UCCJA, therefore,
does not require a court to have personal jurisdiction over both parents
24. Zimmerman, v. Newton, 1997 N.D. 197, 9,569 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 n.4; Cordie v. Tank,
538 N.W.2d 214,217 (N.D. 1995); McBride v. McBride, 688 So. 2d 856, 859 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997);
Muller v. Muller, 682 A.2d 1089, 1091-92 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Chapoteau. v. Chapoteau, 659 So. 2d
1381,1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Dyer v. Surratt, 466 S.E.2d 584,586 (Ga. 1996) (finding that the
UCCIA is not the sole determinant of subject matter jurisdiction in interstate custody disputes); Blanco
v. Tonniges, 511 N.W.2d 555,557 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994).
25. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-14.1-12 (1999); UCCJEA § 201,9 U.L.A. 250-51 (Supp. 1998).
26. Leonard G. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. Ra. 795,795 (1964).
27. See Wasserman, supra note 22, at 819-23 nn.23-41.
28. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201 (1977).
29. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
30. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,734-35 (1877).
31. Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So. 2d 561,563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing In re Marriage of
Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903, 908-09 (1981)).
32. Charles W. Talntor, II, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Prir. L. Rsv. 222, 229 (1954)
"There seems to be an inchoate notion that adoption ... operates in rem or quasi in rem, although an
agreement as the identity of the res and as to its situs does not exist." Id.
33. Id.
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or contestants for it to have jurisdiction to address custody issues. 34
However, it is clear that custody decisions have a significant impact on
the parent-child relationship, especially for the parent who is not the
primary custodian. 35 Further, proceedings for adoptions and/or
termination of parental rights can have the effect of completely severing
the parent-child relationship, so due process concerns appear to be even
higher in these cases. Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court has
not addressed the issue of whether due process mandates personal
jurisdiction over a parent in a custody action. Rather, courts assume
without question that the UCCJA meets these due process concerns.36
Consequently, under the UCCJA, parents are often coerced into
submitting to the jurisdiction of a state that has no in personam jurisdic-
tion over them. The parent may be required to travel long distances,
expend immense sums of money and litigate custody in a state in which
the parent has never had any contact and which may be a hostile forum.
In addition, parents who choose to fight for custody of their children
find that, in many states, an appearance in court triggers in personam
jurisdiction, allowing litigation of matters such as child support, alimony,
and property division. This is true even if litigation over these matters
would not have been allowed, absent the UCCJA, by reason of the due
process clause.
While the UCCJEA as enacted in North Dakota does not address all
of these issues, its provisions are intended to resolve some of them. First,
section 14-14.1-08 sets forth that participation in a custody proceeding,
including a modification proceeding, is not consent to in personam
jurisdiction for other proceedings in the state if no alternate basis for
such jurisdiction exists.3 7
Second, section 14-14.1-09 sets forth that "[a] court of this state
may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding
34. Balestrieri, 622 So. 2d at 563. "Of the 17 states, [which have considered whether custody dis-
putes require minimum contacts or in personam jurisdiction over the parents or parties,] 14 have
interpreted the Shaffer status exception to apply to custody cases brought pursuant to the UCC.A." Id.
Thus, those 14 states have found that personal jurisdiction over the parents is not required in custody
disputes. Md.
35. Watkins v. Watdins, 466 SE.2d 860,861-62 (Ga. 1996).
36. Carol S. Bruch, Statutory Reform of Constitutional Doctrine: Fining International Shoe to
Family Law. 32 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 1047 (1995).
37. N.D. CE ,r. CODE § 14-14.1-08 (1999); UrNr. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & EWFOCRCMENT
Act § 109, 9 U.L.A. 247 (Supp. 1998) [hereinafter UCCJEA]. The Act sets forth that if a person is
subject to personal jurisdiction in the state on a basis other than physical presence in the state for the
custody proceeding, the person is not immune from process in the state. N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-14.1-08; UCCJEA § 109, 9 U.L.A. 247. The Act goes on to state that this immunity does not extend
to civil litigation based on unrelated acts committed by an individual while present in the state. ND.
CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-08; UCCJEA § 109,9 U.L.A. 247.
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arising under this chapter."38 This section helps to address the issue of
inconvenience for the non-resident parent. For example, the court may
allow the parties to participate in the communications and, in instances
other than scheduling matters, the court must make a record of the
communication. 39 Further, the Act allows parties to a custody action to
offer testimony of witnesses located in another state by deposition or
other means allowable in the forum state for out-of-state witnesses. 40 The
court may also allow individuals residing in another state to testify by
telephone or by audiovisual or other electronic means.4 1 These
provisions attempt to allow courts to cooperate with one another to make
access and litigation more convenient for the out-of-state parent or child.
Third, the UCCJEA includes section 14-14.1-11, which is at the
heart of the intent for judicial cooperation underlying the Act.42 This
38. N.D. CErr. CODE § 14-14.1-09; UCCJEA § 110, 9 U.L.A. 248.
(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a
proceeding arising under this [Chapter].
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties
are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity
to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.
(3) Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, and similar
matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be made of the
communication.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), a record must be made of a
communication under this section. The parties must be informed promptly of the
communication and granted access to the record.
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is inscribed on a
tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable
in perceivable form.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-09; UCCJEA § 110, 9 U.L.A. 248.
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-09(1) & (4); UCCYEA § I10(a) & (d), 9 U.L.A. 248.
40. N.D. CEr. CoDE § 14-14.1-10(1); UCCJBA § 111(a), 9 U.L.A. 249.
41. ND. CEiT. CODE § 14-14.1-10(2); UCCIA § 111(b), 9 U.L.A. 249.
42. N.D. Cetr. CODE § 14-14.1-11. See also UCCIBA § 112 comment, 9 U.L.A. 249-50. Section
14-14.1-11 of the North Dakota Century'Code sets forth:
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to:
(a) Hold an evidentiary hearing;
(b) Order a person to produce or give evidence pursuant to procedures of that
state;
(c) Order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a child involved
in a pending proceeding;
(d) Forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of the record
of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any evaluation prepared
in compliance with the request; and
(e) Order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having physical
custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without the child.
(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may hold a hearing or
enter an order described in subsection (1)..
(3) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under subsections (1)
and (2) may be assessed against the parties according to the law of this state.
(4) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records of
hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child custody
proceeding until the child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate request by a
308
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section allows a forum-state court to request a court of another state to
hold an evidentiary hearing, order a person to give evidence according
to the procedures of that state, forward certified copies of transcripts
produced at hearings in the other state, and/or order a party having
physical custody of the child to appear with or without the child. This
section provides a mechanism for courts to cooperate with each other in
an efficient manner without causing undue expense to the parties.4 3
Finally, the UCCJEA contains a section regarding inconvenient
forums. 44 Section 14-14.1-18 sets forth that if a court of one state,
which has jurisdiction over a custody proceeding, determines that it is an
inconvenient forum, it may stay its proceedings and allow the action to
proceed in the more appropriate forum.45 In making this determination,
the court shall consider all relevant factors, some of which include
whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the
future and, if so, which state can best protect the parties; the length of
court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall forward a
certified copy of those records.
N.D. CEur. CODE § 14-14.1-11.
43. UCCIBA § 112 comment, 9 U.L.A. 249-50. See also N.D. CEm. CODE § 14-14.1-11.
44. N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-18; UCCIEA § 207,9 U.L.A. 257-58. Section 14-14.1-18 of the
North Dakota Century Code sets forth:
(1) A court of this state which has jurisdiction under this [Act] to make a child-custody
determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that
it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state
is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon
motion of a party, the court's own motion, or request of another court.
(2) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall
consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction.
For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall
consider all relevant factors, including:
(a) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future
and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(b) The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
(c) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would
assumejurisdiction;
(d) The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(e) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
(f) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending
litigation, including testimony of the child;
(g) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(h) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending
litigation.
(3) If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of
another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings upon condi-
tion that a child-custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated
state and may impose any other condition the court considers just and proper.
(4) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this [chapter] if a
child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another
proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.
N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-18.
45. Id.
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time the child has resided out of the state; distances between courts; and
financial circumstances of the parties.46
However, there will still be a number of cases in which the parents,
or persons acting as parents, behave in a reprehensible manner by
removing the child from the state or otherwise hiding, retaining, or
restraining the child. Section 14-14.1-19 of the Act addresses the
"unclean hands" of that person: "If the conduct that creates the
jurisdiction is unjustified, courts must decline to exercise jurisdiction that
is inappropriately invoked by one of the parties." 47 Essentially, this
section ensures that parents who abduct their children will not receive an
advantage for their unjustifiable conduct.4 8
B. NomcE PROVISIONS
The UCCJA contains two notice provisions. The first enumerates
which parties- are entitled to notice and is directed at in-state contestants,
parents whose parental rights are still intact and persons with physical
custody of the child.49 The method for providing notice to such persons
is governed by the law of the state exercising jurisdiction. 50 The second
notice provision applies to out-of-state contestants. These participants
are to be given notice "in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual
notice."5 1 The comment to UCCJA section five warns that the notice
and opportunity to be heard given to such contestants must always meet
with due process requirements as they exist at the time of the
proceeding. 52 However, the notice requirements are waived if a person
submits to the jurisdiction of the court.53
Neither the text of the Act nor its comments address the existence of
the out-of-state notice provisions in the context of a custody proceeding
in which the rights of an out-of-state parent are adjudicated by a court
that lacks personal jurisdiction over the parent. However, this was the
intended result of the Act as set forth in section 12, which concludes that
the custody decree shall be binding on all parties notified pursuant to the
46. Id.
47. N.D. CamN. CODE § 14-14.1-19; UCCJEA § 208. 9 U.L.A. 259. However, it is important to
note exceptions, such as when the other party with clean hands consents to the exercise of jurisdiction,
if the court with jurisdiction under sections 14-14.1-18 determines this court is the more appropriate
forum, or if no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under section 14-14.1-12 to -14 of the
chapter. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.I-19(I)(a)-(c); UCCJEA § 208(a)(1)-(3), 9 U.L.A. 259.
48. UCCJEA § 208 comment, 9 U.L.A. 259-60. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-19.
49. UCCIA § 4,9 U.L.A. 208 (1988).
50. Id. § 4 comment.
51. Id. § 5, 9 U.LA. 2-13.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 5(d), 9 U.,.A. 213..
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Act.54 The question whether due process requires personal jurisdiction
over the parents who have no contacts with the state adjudicating the
custody issue, however, remains unanswered. 55
The UCCJEA as enacted in North Dakota makes few changes to the
UCCJA notice provisions. Section 14-14.1-16 sets forth which con-
testants are entitled to notice of the pending custody action. These
include all persons entitled to notice under the laws of the forum state as
well as any parent whose parental rights have not been terminated and
any person having physical custody of the child.56 Ultimately, local law
will determine who is entitled to notice.
The UCCJEA also authorizes that notice for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the out-of-state participant shall be given in a manner pre-
scribed by the laws of the state in which the proceeding is being heard or
by the laws of the state in which the notice is being given. The UCCJEA
allows notice to be had by publication, but it still requires notice to be
given in a manner calculated to give actual notice.57
As with most states, North Dakota allows notice to be given by
personal delivery, by certified mail, restricted delivery or publication.S8
However, a closer look at North Dakota's publication statute indicates
that when service is made by publication, the publication must take place
in the county in which the action is pending.59 In addition to publishing
in a newspaper of general circulation, a copy of the summons and
complaint must be mailed to the defendant's last known address. 60 If
the defendant in the custody action has no contacts or connections with
North Dakota, it is doubtful that service by publication will comport with
due process requirements. The better practice would be to publish in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county of the defendant's last
known address. Publishing in a county where the defendant was last
known to reside would more likely comport with the Act's requirement
of "notice in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice."61
Further, it is critical to note that, under the UCCJEA, the custody
proceeding is commenced at the time the first pleading in an action is
54. Id. § 12,9 U.L.A. 274.
55. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (finding, in a decision handed down by a badly frag-
mented bench, that personal jurisdiction over a mother is required in order to deprive her of the
custody of her children in a divorce proceeding). See also Shaffer v. Heilner, 433 U.S. 186, 208, 211
nn. 30 & 37 (1997).
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-16(1) (1999); UCCJEA § 205(a), 9 U.L.A. 256 (Supp. 1998).
57. N.D. CEmr. CODE § 1414.1-07(1); UCCIBA § 108(a). 9 U.L.A. 247.
58. N.D. R. Crv. P. 4 (1998).
59. N.D. R. Crv. P. 4(e)(3).
60. N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(4).
61. See UCCJA § 5(a), 9 U.L.A 213 (1988).
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filed.62 This differs from the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure,
which set forth that an action is commenced upon service of the
summons. 63 Finally, section 14-14.1-17 sets forth certain cases,
involving simultaneous proceedings, in which the "first in time" rule
applies.64 To avoid these issues, the prudent practitioner should consider
filing UCCIEA actions quickly, especially when there appears to be more
than one state with jurisdiction over the matter.
III. BASES FOR ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
The UCCJA establishes four alternative jurisdictional grounds for
making custody determinations: home state, significant connection,
emergency, and vacuum jurisdiction. 65 The UCCJA does not prioritize
home state jurisdiction; however, the comment to section 3 states that
"[i]n the first place, a court in the child's home state has jurisdiction."66
Nevertheless, there is still the possibility that more than one state may
have jurisdiction, and thus a home state and significant connection state
may attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the same custody dispute at the
same time. 67 The UCCJEA seeks to resolve the conflicts that resulted
from this unclear language.
A. HOME STATE JURISDICTION
In essence, the UCCIA defines a home state as the state where the
child lived with both parents, one parent, or a parent substitute for six
consecutive months or, for a child less than six months of age, from
birth.68 The six-month time frame must have been immediately prior to
the commencement of the action, and it includes periods of temporary
absence. 69 Further, a state which was the home state of the child
immediately prior to the commencement of the action can exercise
jurisdiction even if the child no longer resides in the state, so long as a
parent or parent substitute continues to reside in the state and the child
62. N.D. CENr. Cone § 14-14.1-01(4) (1999); UCCJEA § 102(4). 9 U.L.A. 243 (Supp. 1998).
63. N.D. R. Civ. P. 3 (1998).
64. UCCEA § 206 comment, 9 U.L.A. 257. See also N.D. CET. CODE § 14-14.1-17(1). Under
this Act, the simultaneous proceedings problem will arise only when there is no home state, no state
with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and more than one significant connection state. UCCJEA § 206
comment, 9 U.L.A. 257. See also N.D. Cmrr. CODE § 14-14.1-17(1).
65. Hoff, supra note 17, at 278.
66. UCCJA § 3 comment 9 U.L.A. 144 (1988). This definition of home state may be contrasted
to the definition of home state in the PKPA which sets forth that the exercise of significant connection
jurisdiction is permissible only if no other state would have home state jurisdiction. If another state
would have home state jurisdiction, significant connection jurisdiction may not be exercised unless the
home state declines to exercisejurisdiction. Cf. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
67. Hoff, supra note 17, at 278.
68. UCCIA § 3,9 U.L.A. 143.
69. Id. § 2.9 U.L.A. 133.
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has been removed from the state by someone, either because that person
is seeking custody or for other reasons. 70
The UCCJEA has prioritized home state jurisdiction7 1 This closes
the jurisdictional loopholes created by the absence of priority in the
jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA and brings the Act in compliance
with the PKPA. Thus, the UCCJEA ensures that custody and visitation
orders will be given full faith and credit by sister states.
B. SIGNIFICANT CONNECTION JURISDICTION
The next jurisdictional basis set forth in the UCCJA allows a state
competent to decide child custody matters to have jurisdiction if it is in
the best interest of the child because there is 1) a significant connection
to the state and 2) substantial evidence regarding the child's present or
future care exists in the state.72 Both of these requirements must be met.
The significant connection must exist between the child, the parents and
the forum, or between the child, at least one contestant and the forum.J3
The UCCJEA amends the UCCJA's significaxit connection statute in
three important areas. First, the language regarding the best interests of
the child has been eliminated. 74 This phrase tended to confuse the
jurisdictional issues with the substantive custody issues.75
Second, the state may exercise significant connection jurisdiction
only when there is no home state, or when the home state has declined to
exercise jurisdiction because the significant connection state would be
the more appropriate forum.7 6 Again, this brings the Act in compliance
with the PKPA and further assures that custody orders will be given full
faith and credit in sister states.
Third, the UCCJA language regarding the child's "present or
future care" has been eliminated.77 Instead, the UCCJEA requires that
substantial evidence be available regarding the child's care, protection,
70. Id. § 3(a)Cl)(ii), 9 U.LA. 143.
71. N.D. CENr. CoDE § 14-14.1-12 (1999); UCCJEA § 201,9 U.L.A. 250-51 (Supp. 1998).
72. UCCJA § 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. 143.
73. Id.
74. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-12; UCCJEA § 201, 9 U.L.A. 250-5I. In its comments, the
UCCJEA states that the significant connection:
jurisdictional basis has been amended in four particulars from the UCCIA. First, the
"best interest" language of the UCCYA has been eliminated. This phrase tended to
create confusion between the jurisdictional issue and the substantive custody
determination. Since the language was not necessary for the jurisdictional issue, it has
been removed.
UCCJEA § 201 comments, 9 UL.A. 251. See also N.D. CEr. CODE § 14-14.1-12.
75. UCCJEA § 201 comments, 9 UL.A. 251-52. See also NJ). CEcr. CODE § 1414.1-12.
76. N.D. CENt. CoDE § 14-14.1-12; UCCIEA § 201, 9 U.L.A. 250-51.
77. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-12; UCCJEA § 201, 9 U.L.A. 250-51.
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training, and personal relationships.7S Courts often cited the "future
care" language as a reason to refuse to recognize the continuing juris-
diction of the state that made the original child custody determination. 79
These courts reasoned that since the child no longer resided in the state,
there was no evidence present in that state regarding the child's future
care. To avoid this problem, the UCCJEA focuses on the premise that
the jurisdiction with the most evidence should make the custody deci-
sion, whether or not that evidence relates to past care as well as present
and future care.
C. EMERGENCY JURISDICTION
The next jurisdictional basis set forth in the UCCJA addresses
emergency jurisdiction. This section predates the widespread enactment
of domestic violence statutes. The Act sets forth two requirements
regarding emergency jurisdiction: The child must be physically present
in the forum, and the child must be in danger because of abuse or
neglect.80 The comment provides that jurisdiction is conferred by this
.section only when a child requires immediate protection, based upon the
parens patriae jurisdiction of the forum.8 1 Generally, this section has
been construed to confer jurisdiction to make temporary orders only.8 2
However, some courts have utilized this emergency provision as a basis
to modify an existing out of state custody order.
Under the UCCJEA, this section remains an extraordinary jurisdic-
tion reserved for extraordinary circumstances.8 3 However, the UCCJEA
moves the emergency jurisdiction provisions to a new section.84 Pursu-
ant to this section, a court may take jurisdiction to protect a child be-
cause the child has been abandoned or the child, a sibling or parent of
the child is subject to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.a5 A
state may issue a custody order even though it has neither home state nor
significant connection jurisdiction. However, it still may only make a
temporary order, since the purpose of this section is to protect the child
78. N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-12; UCCJEA § 201,9 UJ..A. 250-51.
79. Spector, supra note 6, at 337 n.75.
80. UCCJA § 3(a)(3), 9 U.LA. 144 (1988). "[T"he child is physically present in this State and (i)
the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he
has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected [or
dependent]:' Id.
81. UCCJA § 3 comment, 9 UL.A. 145 (1988).
82. Hache v. Riley, 451 A.2d 971, 975-76 (1982); Nussbauxner v. Nussbaumer, 442 So. 2d 1094,
1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
83. UCCJEA § 204 comment, 9 U.L.A. 254-56. See also N.D. Cmnr. CODE § 14-14.1-15.
84. UCCJBA § 201 comment, 9 U.L.A. 251-52. See also N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-12.
85. ND. CEtr. CoDE § 14-14.1-15; UCCJEA § 204,9 U.L.A. 254.
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until the state that has jurisdiction enters an order.86 The UCCJEA also
sets forth that if a custody action has been commenced in, or an order
has been made by, another state claiming jurisdiction, the emergency
forum must communicate with those courts.87 If there is no existing
custody determination, and no custody proceeding is filed, an
emergency custody order becomes final, if the order so provides, and if
the emergency forum becomes the home state of the child.8
D. DEFAULT OR VACUUM JURISDICTION
The provisions of default or vacuum jurisdiction remains relatively
unchanged in the UCCJEA. The Act sets forth that a court may exercise
jurisdiction if it is in the best interests of the child and either no other
state has jurisdiction under the act or if another state has declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction in favor of the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction.8 9
IV. MODIFICATION JURISDICTION
The language of the UCCJA failed to enunciate clearly exactly
when a court may modify another state's custody order. This has re-
sulted in conflicting custody decrees and different interpretations regard-
ing how long the jurisdiction of the initiating court lasts. The UCCJA sets
forth that if a court of another state has made a custody decree, another
state's court shall not modify that decree unless 1) it appears to the new
court that the court which rendered the decree does not now have.
jurisdiction under the UCCJA and 2) the new court has jurisdiction
under the UCCJA.90 Some courts have held that they may modify
another state's custody order if the modification state has become the
home state. 91 The issue is further complicated by the problem of deter-
mining if the state with continuing jurisdiction has relinquished that
jurisdiction to the modifying state.
The UCCJEA clarifies both of these concerns by providing rules for
continuing jurisdiction in modification decrees. In fact, under the
UCCJEA, the continuing jurisdiction of the state initiating the custody
86. N.D. CEor. CODE § 14-14.1-15(2)-(3); UCCJEA § 204(b)-(c). 9 U.L.A. 254. The emergency
order must specify a time period in which the person obtaining the order must obtain an order from the
state exercisingjurisdiction over the prior custody issues. See UCCJEA § 204 comment, 9 U.L.A. 254-
56. See also N.D. CENT. CoDe § 14-14.1-15.
87. N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-15(4); UCCJEA § 204(d), 9 U.L.A. 254.
88. UCCJHA § 204 comment, 9 U.L.A. 254-56. See also N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-15.
89. N.D. C wr. CoDE § 14-14.1-12(I)(d); UCCJEA § 201(a)(4), 9 U.L.A. 250-51.
90. UCCJA § 14,9 U.LA. 292 (1988).
91. Russell M. Coomnbs. Progress under the PKPA, 6 L AM. AcAD. MATir .LAW. 59, 62 n.15
(1990) (providing examples of variations and conflicting decisions).
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order is exclusive.92 This exclusive jurisdiction continues until one of
two events occur. First, continuing jurisdiction is lost if none of the
parties continue to have a significant connection with the original decree
state and if there is no longer substantial evidence concerning the child's
care, protection and training and personal relations in the state. 93 Thus,
if the relationship between the child and the person remaining in the
state becomes so tenuous that the court could no longer find a
significant connection to the state, jurisdiction would no longer exist.
However, a party seeking to modify a custody order must obtain an
order from the original decree state which indicates that the original state
no longer has jurisdiction.94
Second, continuing jurisdiction is lost when neither the child nor the
child's parents or parent substitutes resides in the original decree state.95
Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction is not reestablished if, after the child,
the parents, and all persons acting as parents leave the state, the
92. N.D. CErr. CODE § 14-14.1-13; UCCJEA § 202,9 U.L.A. 252.
1. Except as otherwise provided in section 14-14.1-15, a court of this state.which has
made a child custody determination consistent with section 14-14.1-12 or 14-14.1-14
has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
a. A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent,
nor the child and a person acting as a parent do not have a significant connection
with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state
concerning the child's care, protection, tirining, and perional relationships; or
b. A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's
parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.
2. A court of this state, which has made a child custody determination and does not have
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination
only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 14-14.1-08.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-13. *
93. UCCJBA § 202 comment, 9 U.L.A. 252-53. See also N.D. Ctr. CODE § 14-14.1-13.
This section provides the rules of continuing jurisdiction and borrows from UIFSA as
well as recent UCCJA case law. The continuing jurisdiction of the original decree state is
exclusive. It continues until one of two events occurs:
1. If a parent or a person acting as a parent remains in the original decree state,
continuing jurisdiction is lost when neither the child, the child and a parent, nor the
child and a person acting as a parent continue to have a significant connection with
the original decree state and there is no longer substantial evidence concerning the
child's care, protection, training and personal relations in that state. In other words,
even if the child has acquired a new home state, the original decree state retains
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, so long as the general requisites of the "substantial
connection" jurisdiction provisions of Section 201 are met. If the relationship
between the child and the person remaining in the state with exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction becomes so attenuated that the court could no longer find significant
connections and substantial evidence, jurisdiction would no longer exist.
The use of the phrase "a court of this State" under subsection (a)(1) makes it clear that
the original decree state is the sole determinant of whether jurisdiction continues. A
party seeking to modify a custody determination must obtain an order from the original
decree state stating that it no longer has jurisdiction. (footnotes omitted).
UCCJEA § 202 comment, 9 U.L.A. 252-53. See also N.D. Cstr. CoDE § 14-14.1-13.
94. UCCJEA § 202 comment, 9 UL.A. 252-53. See also N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-13.
95. UCCJEA § 202 comment, 9 U.L.A. 252-53. See also N.D. CEmr. CODE § 14-14.1-13.
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non-custodial parent returns. 96 Once a state has lost continuing jurisdic-
tion, it can modify its own custody order only if it again has one of the
jurisdictional bases of section 14-14.1-12.97
V. APPLICATION OF THE UCCJEA
Two issues arise when the provisions of the UCCJEA are put into
practice. The first concerns which actions the Act covers; the second
concerns pleading requirements.
A. DEFINING A "CUSTODY PROCEEDING"
The UCCJA is unclear regarding the kinds of custody cases to
which it applies. As a result, states have been less than uniform both in
determining what types of proceedings are governed by the Act and in
applying the Act to the proceedings. 98
In contrast, the UCCJEA includes a sweeping definition of custody
proceedings that includes virtually all cases that can involve custody of
or visitation with a child.99 'The term includes a proceeding for di-
vorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity,
termination of parental rights and protection from domestic violence, in
which the issue may appear."100 However, the UCCJEA specifically
excludes juvenile delinquency actions, contractual emancipation or
enforcement under Article 3 of the Act,101 and the term does not include
adoptions.'0 2 Overall, however, the UCCJEA has reduced the ambiguity
of the UCCJA by redefining what types of cases are subject to the Act.
B. PLEADING REQumREMENTS'
The UCCJEA mirrors the UCCJA by setting forth the type of
information which must be included in the first pleading or attached
96. UCClEA § 202 comment, 9 U.LA. 252-53. see also N.D. CEtr. CoDs § 14-14.1-13.
97. N.D. CEr. CoDE § 14-14.1-13(2); UCCJEA § 202(b), 9 U_.A. 252.
98. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, What Types of Proceedings or Determination are
Governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, 78 A.L.R. 4th 1028 (1990) (providing a thorough discussion of the patchwork
application of the UCCTA in determining what custody proceedings the act covers).
99. N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-01; UCCJEA § 102,9 U.L.A. 243-44.
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-01(3); UCCJEA § 102(4), 9 U.L.A. 243.
"Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical
custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding
for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination
of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear.
The term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual
emancipation, or enforcement under Sections 1414.1-22 through 14-14.1-37.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-01(3); UCCJEA § 102(4), 9 U.L.A. 243.
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-01(3); UCCJEA § 102(4), 9 U.L.A. 243.
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1414.1-02; UCCJEA § 103,9 U.L.A. 244-45.
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affidavit pertaining to the custody proceeding.l03 The first pleading or
attached affidavit must contain the following information: 1) whether the
party has participated, as a party or witness, in any other proceeding
concerning the custody of or visitation with the child, and if so, the court,
case number, and date of the custody determination; 2) whether the
party knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding,
including proceedings for the enforcement and any proceedings related
to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights,
and adoptions, and, if so, the court, case number, and nature of the
proceedings; and '3) whether the party knows the names and addresses of
any person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of
the child or claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or
visitation with the child, and, if so, the names and addresses of those
persons.104 Further, each party is under a continuing duty to inform the
court of any proceeding in any state which may affect the current
proceeding.10s
If a party does not furnish the information, the court may upon its
own motion or upon motion of one of the parties stay the proceeding
until the party complies. 106 The model UCCIEA mandates that when
disclosure of the information is found to jeopardize the health, safety, or
liberty of a party or child, the information must be sealed and may not
be disclosed to the other party or the public unless the court, after a
hearing, orders the information disclosed,1 07 but the North Dakota
enactment does not include this language.
VI. INDIAN TRIBES
Neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA expressly address whether custo-
dy orders issued by a tribal court are recognized for enforcement under
the Act. However, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requires that
full faith and credit be given to tribal custody orders. 108 ICWA only
applies to tribal custody orders that involve an Indian child, defined as
an unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either a member
of a federally-recognized tribe or is eligible for membership in a
federally-recognized tribe and is- the biological child of a member of a
federally-recognized tribe.109 Further, ICWA applies to the following
103. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-20; UCCJEA § 209.9 U.L.A. 260.
104. N.D. CEir. CODE § 14-14.1-20(l)(a)-(c); UCCJEA § 209(a)(i)-(3). 9 U.L.A. 260.
105. N.D. CUMr. CODE § 14-14.1-20(4); UCCJEA § 209(d), 9 U.L.A. 260.
106. N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-20(2); UCCJBA § 209(b), 9 U.L.A. 260.
107. UCCEA § 209(e), 9 U.L.A. 260.
108. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1994).
109. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
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four types of custody proceedings: 1) foster care placements, 2)
termination of parental rights, 3) pre-adoption placement, and 4)
adoption placements. 1I0  In these types of cases, federal law mandates
that states give full faith and credit to tribal custody orders.
But what about children who reside on Indian reservations who are
not eligible for enrollment in a federally recognized tribe? Are states
mandated to recognize and enforce tribal custody orders if ICWA does
not apply? In the interest of comity, one would hope that states would
recognize tribal custody orders in either circumstance. In North Dakota,
tribes could utilize Court Rule 7.2, which sets forth that Indian tribes in
North Dakota are considered the equivalent of foreign nations for the
purpose of recognizing the orders and judgments of tribal courts.111 For
recognition under Rule 7.2, tribal court judgments must be filed in state
court. 112 However, many courts have reached different conclusions
regarding whether the UCCJA applies to settle these disputes between
states and tribes. 113
Section 14-14.1-03 provides specific guidance with regard to
custody orders issued by a tribal court.1 14 In essence, 14-14.1-03
requires state courts to treat tribes as if they were states and tribal custody
proceedings as if they were sister state proceedings. Further, states will
be required to enforce all tribal custody orders which substantially
conform with the requirements of the UCCJEA.115
110. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
111. N.D.R. Cr. 7.2 (1998). Rule 7.2 basically sets forth that unless a party objects to them, tribal
court orders are recognized and have the same effect and are subject to the same procedures,
defenses, and proceedings as judgments of any court of record in this state. Id. Rule 7.2 goes on to set
forth the procedures for recognition if a party objects to the tribal court order. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Hoff, supra note 17, at 277 (citing Patricia Hoff et al., Jurisdiction in Child Custody and
Abduction Cases: A Judge's Guide to the UCCJA, PKPA, and the Hague Child Abduction Convention,
48 Juv. & FAt. Cr. L., Spring 1997, at 1-2.
114. While section 14-14.1-03 specifically sets out that the UCCIEA does not purport to legislate
custody jurisdiction for tribal courts, the effect is the same. If a tribal custody order does not
substantially comply with the UCCJEA, a state could use the act to prevent the recognition of a
non-ICWA tribal court order. Tribes would be wise to familiarize themselves with the PKPA,
discussed at length in this article, which manilates full faith and credit among sister states. However,
the PKPA does not specifically address treating Indian Tribes as states.
115. N.D. CENT. CooE § 14-14.1-03 (1999); UCCJEA § 104,9 U.L.A. 245 (Supp. 1998).
1. A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in the Indian
Child Welfare Act. [25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.], is not subject to this chapter to the
extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.
2. A court of this state shall treat a tribe as if it were a state for the purpose of applying
sections 14-14.1-01 through 14-14.1-21.
3. A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances in
substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this chapter must be
recognized and enforced under sections 14-14.1-22 through 14-14.1-37.
N.D. CET. COD § 14-14.1-03.
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VII. THE UCCJEA'S NEW, MORE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS
The UCCJEA also contains several provisions that together provide
for more effective enforcement of orders than does the UCCJA. First,
under the UCCJEA, state courts shall treat a foreign country as if it were
a state of the United States for purposes of questioning jurisdiction and
enforcement of the Act.116 Further, section 14-14.1-23 requires that
North Dakota courts recognize and enforce a child custody determina-
tion of a court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in
substantialconformity with the UCCJEA.117
Second, the UCCJEA has a new, more simplified procedure for
registering a custody determination in another state. 118 Under the
116. N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-04(1); UCCJEA § 105, 9 U.L.A. 245.
117. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-23(1); UCCIEA § 303,9 U.L.A. 262.
118. N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-25; UCCJEA § 305,9 U.L.A. 263-64.
1. A child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in
this state, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the
district court in this state:
a. A letter or other document requesting registration;
b. Two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be regis-
tered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge
and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and
c. Except as otherwise provided in section 14-14.1-20, the name and address of the
person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has
been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be
registered.
2. On receipt of the dociments required by subsection 1, the registering court shall:
a. Cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy
of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form; and
b. Serve notice upon the persons named pursuant to subdivision c of subsection I
and provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance
with this section.
3. The notice required by subdivision b of subsection 2 must state that:
a. A registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration in the
same manner as a determination issued by a court of tis state;
b. A hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination must be requested
within 20 days after service of notice; and
c. Failure to contest the registration will result in confirmation of the child custody
determination and preclude further contest of that determination with respect to
any matter that could have been asserted.
4. A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must request a hearing
within 20 days after service of the notice. At that hearing, the court shall confirm the
registered order unless the person contesting registration establishes that:
a. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under sections 14-14.1-12 through
14-14.1-21;
b. The child-custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated, stayed,
or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under 14-14.1-12 through
14-14.1-21;
c. The person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in
accordance with the standards of section 14-14.1-07, in the proceedings before the
court that issued the order for which registration is sought.
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UCCJEA, one need only send a letter requesting registration, copies of
the order to be registered, a sworn statement that the order has not been
modified and the name and address of any party given custody or
visitation by the order.11 9 This process is simple enough for a parent to
start without an attorney, 120 and a request for registration may be accom-
panied with a request for enforcement. 121
Third, section 14-14.1-24 contains a provision for temporary
visitation. 122 This provision allows a court to issue a temporary visitation
order to make up for lost visitation. 123 This section also allows a court
issuing a temporary visitation order to interpret such general phrases as
"reasonable and seasonable visitation" and to substitute a visitation
schedule where none is provided in the custody order. 124 However, this
temporary order should stay in effect only long enough to allow the
parties to obtain an order from the court with continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction under Article 2.125
Fourth, the UCCJEA allows for expedited enforcement of custody
determinations.1 26 This remedy was affectionately known as "turbo
habeas" and "the blitz" by the drafting committee. 127 In essence, this
should become the remedy of choice where prompt recovery of a child
is paramount. New enforcement procedures provide for an enforcement
hearing, nornally within twenty-four hours, which will result in an order
authorizing the petitioner to take immediate custody of the child unless
5. If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made,
the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and the person requesting registration
and all persons served must be notified of the confirmation.
6. Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law of after notice and
hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could
have been asserted at the time of registration.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-25.
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-25, UCCJEA § 305.9 U.L.A. 263.64.
120. See Hoff, supra note 17, at 289.
121. See Hoff, supra note 17, at 289.
122. N.D. CEmr. CoDE § 14-14.1-24; UCCJEA § 304,9 U.L.A. 263.
1. A court of this state which does not have jurisdiction to modify a child custody
determination, may issue a temporary order enforcing:
a. A visitation schedule made by a court of another state; or
b. The visitation provisions of a child custody determination of another state
that does not provide for a specific visitation schedule.
2. If a court of this state makes an order under subdivision b of subsection 1. it shall
specify in the order a period that it considers adequate to allow the petitioner to obtain
an order from a court having jurisdiction under the criteria specified in sections
14-14.1-12 through 14-14.1-21. The order remains in effect until an order is obtained
from the other court or the period expires.
N.D. Cmr. CODE § 14-14.1-24.
123. N.D. Csm-. COoE § 14-14.1-24.
124. UCCJEA § 304 comment. 9 U.L.A. 263. See also N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-14.1-24.
125. UCCJFA § 304 comment, 9 U.LA. 263. See also N.D. Cmtr. CoDE § 14-14.1-24.
126. N.D. CEmr. CODE §§ 14-14.1-28 to -30; UCCJEA §§ 308-310,9 U.L.A. 265-67.
127. See Hoff, supra note 17, at 293.
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the respondent establishes one of the few defenses available under the
Act.128
In addition, to prevent abduction by a fleeing parent, the UCCEA
provides for issuance of a warrant to take physical custody of a child
upon a finding that the "child is imminently likely to suffer serious
physical harm or be removed from the state." 129 To obtain the warrant,
the petitioner files a verified application and provides testimony to the
court. 130 Upon making the required findings of imminent harm or
removal from the state, the court may issue a warrant for the immediate
pick up of the child and providing for the best interests of the child
pending the enforcement hearing. 131
Finally, section 14-14.1-35 provides for a state's attorney to take
any lawful action, which includes resorting to any proceeding available
under sections 14-14.1-22 through 14-14.1-37, to locate a child, obtain
the safe return of a child or to enforce a child custody order.132 The
public official should take action ff there is an existing custody determi-
nation, a request to do so from a court in a pending custody proceeding,
if the public official has a reasonable belief that a criminal statute has
been violated or has a reasonable belief that the child has been wrongful-
ly removed or detained. 133
VIII. CONCLUSION
Over thirty years after the enactment of the UCCJA, the issues of
interstate custody are revisited by the enactment of the UCCJEA. The
result is a metamorphosis of the UCCJA. The UCCJBA accomplishes
three important changes. First, it tightens definitions and jurisdictional
loopholes created by years of inconsistent court interpretations and
rulings. Second, it provides enhanced and more efficient methods of
enforcing custody orders. Finally, it mirrors the PKPA, which will result
in custody orders that are entitled to full faith and credit in sister states.
128. See Hoff, supra note 17, at 293-94. Only three defenses are available under the Act:
(1) whether the issuing court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA Article 2 [ND. CENT
CoDE §§ 14-14.1-12 to -21] to make the order,
(2) whether the respondent received notice in accordance with the standards of
UCCJEA § 108 [N.D. Cxr. CoDn 14-14.1-07]; and
(3) whether the order has been vacated, stayed or modified. If the order has been
registered, only the third defense may be asserted.
See Hoff, supra note 17, at 293-94.
129. See Hoff, supra note 17, at 294.
130. See Hoff, supra note 17, at 294.
131. See Hoff, supra note 17. at 295.
132. N.D. C'W. CODE § 14-14.1-35 (1999); UCCIEA § 315.9 U.L.A. 269 (Supp. 1998).
133. N.D. CMer. CODE § 14-14.1-35; UCCIBA § 315,9 U.L.A. 269.
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